� � � � Since I have enjoyed many books published by your company and especially respect the aviation writing of Mr. Martin Caidin, this letter is an attempt to persuade you both to produce a book on this subject with the impact of Flying Forts, Zero!, Me-109 and others.

� � � � As a former Combat Fighter Pilot, Fighter Training Instructor, and Staff Combat Operations Officer with experience in P-38, P-40 and P-51 aircraft, I am continually provoked by the repetitive inaccurate writing that forms the history of the P-38. As the B-17 shaped Bomber Doctrine, I am convinced that the P-38 has had as great an impacton Fighter Doctrine.

� � � � Considering the fragmented and inaccurate history on this great machine, I cannot express too strongly my feeling of urgency for this effort to be made.

� � � � If I may suggest:

� � � � 1. The historic significance of the P-38 has been missed.

� � � � 2. It was the first all-purpose aircraft in the military inventory.

� � � � 3. It was able to adapt to all missions, without reservation, throughout World War II.

� � � � 4. Vastly outnumbered in all combat theaters, it always held its own and advanced against all circumstances until production and training could overpower the enemy.

� � � � 5. It was the direct lead-in to jet operations, including systems, problems, characteristics and capabilities.

� � � � 6. Several ocean crossings led to experiments that formulated post-World War II nuclear delivery and mobile Fighter Doctrine.

� � � � 7. It was the stimulus to air leaders who were later to develop these doctrines. The result was the jet fighter's role as a deterrent with it's nuclear and worldwide capability.

� � � � 8. The P-51s replaced the P-38s mostly for economical reasons and ease of production and training, not because of a significant difference of performance.

� � � � 9. That operational problems were resolved to a highly satisfactory degree and gave the P-38 advantages that no other fighter of the time had.

� � � � 10. That each problem, such as compressibility, supercharger regulators, single generators, cockpit heat,intercoolers, electric propellors, and others, were very interesting, previously unencountered,interrelated, and often suffered from production priorities and plain bad luck.

� � � � 11. That pilot training was unusual compared with single-engine fighter training.

� � � � 12. That Lockheed's close factory-support program has been viewed out of context. Problems were magnified where in competitive cases there was no one around to freely admit to the problem and then attempt to solve it.

� � � � 13. That those who write on the subject fail to counsel with Tony LeVier or even bother to read his fine book, Pilot.

� � � � 14. That an in-depth combat evaluation seldom, if ever, appears in print.

� � � � I offer any aid at my limited means that this proposal be born.